fa l l

07
review
mission drift
Mission Drift—Understand It, Avoid It
James Copestake, p. 20

Trade-offs between Social and
Financial Performance
Gary Woller, p. 14

Closing the Gender Gap
Microcredit is just one of many initiatives
that can challenge unfair gender norms.
Dwight Haase, p. 4

A P U B L I C AT I O N O F T H E B R I G H A M Y O U N G U N I V E R S I T Y E C O N O M I C S E L F - R E L I A N C E C E N T E R

New book!
Edited by Jason Fairbourne, Director,
MicroFranchise Development Initiative, Center for
Economic Self-Reliance, Brigham Young University,
Stephen W. Gibson, formerly Senior Entrepreneur
in Residence, Brigham Young University and
W. Gibb Dyer, O. Leslie Stone Professor of
Entrepreneurship, Marriott School, Brigham Young
University, US

‘Anyone interested in shrinking
the bottom of the world’s income
and wealth pyramid to create real
widespread sustainability and all the
consequent social and health benefits
should read this book.’
– Joseph H. Astrachan, Kennesaw State University, US

‘What do buying honey, renting mobile
phones and fitting prescription glasses
have in common? Answer: they are
all activities that have expanded
in low-income countries through
microfranchising. This book brings
together the ideas of researchers and social
entrepreneurs at the heart of a movement
to turn microfranchising into a mechanism
for sustainable poverty reduction on a
scale to match microfinance. A seductive
mix of advocacy and realism, analysis
and case-study provides readers with the
ingredients to make up their own mind
about the potential of microfranchising as
a development tool.’
– James G. Copestake, University of Bath, UK

This unique book provides an overview of the need to
alleviate poverty and what methods have been used in
the past to do so (e.g. microcredit). It then introduces
the concept of the microfranchise and discusses how
this business model can be used in poverty alleviation.
Different models of microfranchising are reviewed
and specific case studies highlighted to show how it
has worked in different parts of the world. The book
concludes with a discussion of the advantages as well
as the potential problems and pitfalls that accompany
microfranchising.
This book is a must read for business scholars and
economists, practitioners and lenders, members of NGOs
dedicated to poverty alleviation and anyone else who
is interested in learning about an innovative, business
focused tool to alleviate poverty.
Contributors: N. Blumenthal, L.J. Christensen, W.G. Dyer, Jr.,
J.S. Fairbourne, N. Felder-Kuzu, M. Fertig, S.W. Gibson, J. Hatch,
M. Henriques, M. Herr, M. Hoyt, E. Jamison, F. Jiwa, J. Kassalow,
G. Macmillan, K. Magleby, H. Tzaras, J. Van Kirk, B. Wood, W. Woodworth

2007 272 pp Hardback 978 1 84720 108 9 $115.00
Special 20% prepaid discount price $92.00 (plus
shipping). To receive discount please quote promotion
code “ESR07” on the payment page of our website:
www.e-elgar.com

MORE INFORMATION
Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., William Pratt House, 9 Dewey Court, Northampton, MA 01062-3711 USA
Tel: (413) 584-5551 Fax: (413) 584-9933 elgarinfo@e-elgar.com
ORDERS
Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., PO Box 574, Williston, VT 05495-0575 USA
Tel: (800) 390-3149 Fax (802) 864-7626 eep.orders@aidcvt.com

contents

Volume 9 – Issue 2

Editor’s Introduction

2

Finding Balance
by Paul C. Godfrey

Perspectives

14

Trade-offs Between Social and

Financial Performance
by Gary Woller

20

Mission Drift—Understand It, Avoid It
by James Copestake

Research

4

Closing the Gender Gap
by Dwight Haase

10

Innovation Spurs Growth
by Jasmine Mohanty and
Debadutta K. Panda
illustration: Tyler pack

Best Practices

26

Accessing Commercial Capital Markets
by Isaac H. Smith, Michael A. Broderick,
and Richard G. Winsor

Book Review

34

From NGO to MFI: A Guidebook

for Successful Transformations
by Geetha Rao Ramani

Publisher

Production Editor

Todd M. Manwaring

Joy M. Wouden

Editor

Contributing Writers,
Editors, and Designers

Paul C. Godfrey
Advisor

Joseph D. Ogden

Tyler R. Pack,
Brad W. Hales
Webmaster

Art Director

Rachael B. Haney

S. Craig Baker

Partner Profiles
All communication should be sent to:

36		Academy for Creating Enterprise,

Grameen Bank, and ASCEND Alliance
Center News

ESR Review | 712 Tanner Building
Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602
Phone: 866-283-2789 | Fax: 801-422-0499
Email: esrreview@byu.edu | Web: www.esrreview.com

Published by the Economic Self-Reliance Center and the Marriott
School of Management at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Copyright 2007 by Brigham Young University. All rights reserved.

40		Social Innovation Invites

All Disciplines

ISSN: 1932-9075



E di tor’ s I n troduct ion

Finding
Balance
photo: byu

I

n this edition of the ESR Review our
authors address the concern of balance—specifically, how microfinance
institutions and NGOs can strike an
appropriate balance between their stated
social mission and the realities of positive cash flow that keep the doors open.
Even though all the articles take up
the question of balance within the
context of microfinance, those who run
other types of organizations will profit.
We have selected issues and articles that
transcend microfinance; while other
groups may not have the same profitability drivers as MFIs, every social
entrepreneur and organization faces the
task of blending activities to meet the
needs of all stakeholder groups.
Our research section begins with
Dwight Haase’s consideration of how
MFIs can equalize their clientele of
men and women in Nicaragua. Based
on extensive interviews and analysis,
Haase’s contribution blends organizational and structural practices of MFIs
with the constraints and norms of the
country’s culture to explain differential
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benefits between men and women.
Jasmine Mohanty and Debadutta
Panda write about how innovation
has been an important factor in
helping MFIs in India meet growing
demand. One of the key innovations
they note is leveraging relationships
between MFIs and commercial banks
in India—drawing on the unique
strengths of each business model to
broaden penetration.
Gary Woller opens our perspective section with an important
reminder: One key issue to balance is the difference between
reality and hype. Part of balancing
social and economic missions lies
in some form with stakeholder
management—helping stakeholders create reasonable expectations
about what they should expect
from the organization. Problems
with mission drift most often occur
when expectations become so high
that false trade-offs between the
economic and social missions are
deemed necessary.

James Copestake, of the University
of Bath, takes up the issue of mission
drift. Again, while his context is the
MFI, his message should resonate
with every practitioner who is forced
to make trade-offs between two
competing resources or objectives.
He begins by helping us all understand what drives mission drift and
how it differs from simply missed performance targets. Using this model
as a framework and building on his
research in Imp-Act, Copestake provides all practitioners with four recommendations to help their organizations
simultaneously improve financial and
social performance.
Our best practices contribution is
unique. About a year ago, Brigham
Young University professors tasked
a group of MBA students to think
about the burgeoning movement
among MFIs and the capital market.
Their goal was to discover ways to
expand the pool of capital available
for investment by MFIs. The students focused on the “how” ques-

tions: How do they make themselves
attractive to capital market players?
How do they learn to walk and talk
in ways that investment bankers can
understand?
Similarly, how do investors learn
about MFIs? How do investors learn
to screen out the hype from the
reality in a segment that most view
as charitable giving? The lessons of
this exercise should be learned by any
development practitioner seeking to
access financial resources from those
traditionally viewed as hostile.
Geetha Rao Ramani finishes our
issue with an excellent review of
Joanna Ledgerwood and Victoria
White’s Transforming Microfinance
Institutions: Providing Full Financial
Services to the Poor, a book right on
target for MFIs seeking to expand
beyond a purely social mission and
toward a balanced mission where
financial performance becomes
critical for success.
I thank a wonderful staff that
helps me coordinate the work of

good authors and brings together a
wonderful publication. Our production editor, Joy Wouden, moves into
a different role after this issue. Our
relationship will move from face
to face to cyberspace as she moves
away from Provo. Rachael Haney, our
designer, deserves a public thank you
for her work in creating and directing engaging artwork. Finally, thanks
to Todd Manwaring and his staff for
fulfilling a publisher’s role among so
many others. Without his work and
support, this magazine would not
come to fruition.
I hope you find this issue intriguing,
engaging, and enlarging. The issue of
learning how to find the right balance
and avoid mission drift is one we all
face—in business and life. The articles
in this issue provide some insight as
we go about our important tasks.

Paul C. Godfrey
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icrocredit programs around the world offer
equal levels of human capital. I will argue that the differunprecedented opportunities to more than 100
ence is that men are better able to convert their knowledge
million enterprising individuals in pursuit of a and skills into revenue. Women are less able to do so
better life for themselves and their families (Daley-Harris
because they are constrained to less lucrative sectors of
2006). Rigorous studies in various countries have shown
the economy and must balance their work schedule with
the worth of these programs by using quasi-experimental
household duties.
designs to show how microcredit recipients realize higher
METHODS
revenue than their non-borrower peers (Copestake et al.
I employed three methods in my research. The first was
2001; Khanker 1998; Mosley 2001; Park and Changquing
a survey of microcredit borrowers from seven of the ten
2001). However, aggregating all microcredit borrowers into one group may obscure important differences
biggest MFIs in Nicaragua at that time (See Table 1). A
among the borrowers, especially between men and women. stratified random sample of eighty borrowers from each
Therefore, it is important to compare borrowers to each
MFI was selected. Those 560 persons were surveyed in
other, not just to non-borrowers.
their homes by a team of researchers from the Nicaraguan
With more than 575,000 microenterprises and a thrivresearch institute, La Fundación Internacional para el
ing microcredit sector that caters to both men and women,
Desafío Económico Global (FIDEG), during May and
Nicaragua is an ideal setting for such a comparison.
June 2002. The sample did not beget enough women
The Asociacion Nicaraguense de Instituciones de
in agriculture to make a reliable comparison to men.
Microfinanzas (ASOMIF), a consortium of Nicaragua’s
Therefore, I excluded all agricultural borrowers, leaving
twenty-one largest MFIs, has a $108 million portfolio
403 people in the sample—284 (70 percent) women and
with 235,000 borrowers (ASOMIF 2007). Studies such
119 (30 percent) men.
as Pisani and Yoskowitz (2005) show that Nicaraguan
In addition to the survey, I conducted fourteen focus
MFIs are making a positive impact. However, my research group interviews—seven men’s groups and seven women’s
reveals that men are enjoying these benefits more, earning
groups—between December 2004 and January 2005.
32 percent more than women.
These people were borrowers with the same MFIs that I
Researchers often have focused on human capital to
surveyed in 2002. Each focus group had between four and
explain such differences in men’s and women’s earnings.
seven participants. In total, sixty-five people (thirty-two
However, the men and women in my sample actually have men and thirty-three women) participated.



Table 1: Portfolios and Clients of the Sample MFIs [1]
MFI

Number of Clients

Loan Portfolio

FDL

18,119

$11,143,600

FAMA
CONFIA [2]
ACODEP
CARUNA
FJN
Prestanic

[1] Compiled June 30, 2002.
[2] In 2004 CONFIA changed its name to Procredit.

Thirdly, I interviewed staff and
administrators of the seven MFIs. Their
insights helped to corroborate and clarify comments made by the borrowers.
The following sections analyze the
data that were gathered using these
methods. I will begin by comparing
men’s and women’s human capital.
After that, I will look at how microenterprises tend to be segregated by
gender. Finally, I will examine how
household roles and expectations
condition men’s and women’s business practices.
HUMAN CAPITAL

Human capital—education, experience, and skills—is important for
entrepreneurial success around the
world. In his Guatemalan study,
Wydick (1999) claims that “individuals with higher levels of human
capital will expand employment
within their enterprises more rapidly.”
He also shows efficiency increasing
with more human capital. Meanwhile,
Sanchez and Pagan’s (2001) study
of Mexican entrepreneurs shows
that education and experience both
increase earnings.
Unfortunately, human capital
often seems to be lacking for women.
Pollack and Jusidman (1997) say that
women in Mexico are less educated
and have less training than men.
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virtually the same graduation rates
from secondary school: 26 percent
18,565
$7,467,300
for men and 25 percent for women.
16,032
$7,002,100
Men seemed to benefit from educa15,770
$6,072,000
tion more than women, however.
7,172
$3,919,500
Men who graduated from secondary
6,023
$3,333,700
school increased their total monthly
net income by US$224, but the
1,393
$3,008,700
increase for women was only US$89.
The difference in net income
between women who have and
who have not graduated was not
even statistically significant.
In short, women were less able
Sanchez and Pagan (2001) add that
to convert human capital into
Mexican women usually have less
revenue. Celina, who sold fruit in
business experience. Foro (2000)
the Chinandega Central Market,
asserts that women throughout Latin
expressed her frustration with this
America generally lack management
situation: “The lady who sells chickskills. In India, Kantor (2002) argues
ens, across from me, has two daughthat lack of formal education and
ters with [high school] degrees, and
training are constraints that hinder
they are selling chickens with her.
women more than men. And Dijkstra So what did they study for?”
(1998) claims this lack of education
Why did this happen? When I
is one of the major reasons why
posed this question to my focus
Nicaraguan women are unable to gengroups, the men tended to emphasize
erate incomes equal to their male peers. the importance of aggressiveness as
It seems reasonable to infer that
if it were something women innately
differences of human capital explain
lacked. Elvis from Managua said,
the gap in earnings between men
“The woman is more reserved, and
and women in my sample. However,
the man is more adventurous; it’s
when I compared the men’s experiin his genes.”
ence and education to those of the
Several women emphatically
women, they were almost identical.
challenged this notion. For example,
Looking first at experience, both men Candida in Chinandega asserted,
and women in my survey sample had “We have the same ability to start a
an average of approximately eight
business. The problem is that they
years in their respective businesses.
[men] don’t give us the same opporFurthermore, there was not a strong
tunity.” Janet, also from Chinandega,
trend in my findings connecting net
agreed: “We have the ability, but …
income to years of experience—for
[men] put us down. They undereseither gender (See Table 2). In fact,
timate us. They think we are better
both men’s and women’s income seem suited just to wash, iron, and watch
to plateau or even decline with more
the kids.”
years of experience. But an important
These comments show how assessdifference is that women’s income
ing human capital abstractly is insufappears to plateau sooner.
ficient. The real problem is not how
Regarding education, the men
much or little social capital men and
and women in the sample had
women have; it is that society inhibits

research

women from fully utilizing their
human capital. This is not to say that
all men are chauvinists. But women
are generally more aware of these gender constraints, and that awareness is
acute. The result is a sort of segregation where women tend to work in
less profitable enterprises.

domestic chores, which
shows the expectations women have
upon them. In fact,
when I asked my focus
groups if a woman
should stay at home,
half of the men said
yes. For example, Justo
GENDER SEGREGATION
of Somotillo told me,
The concept of gender segregation is
“Look, I will say it: we
not new. Researchers studying the
are machistas (chauvingender wage gap in the United States, ists). I know; I took a
course on gender issues
such as Blau and Khan (1999), have
once. But the problem
invoked this idea to explain much of
is that we expect somethe difference in earnings between
one to keep up the
men and women. And studies of
house. A woman can
women in other countries, such as
work at home, like in
Roos (1985), show similar problems.
a pulperia. But if she
Nicaragua appears to follow this
goes outside to work, I
trend of gender segregation. My
don’t agree with that.
survey data show that women are
Someone needs to stay at home with
much more likely to have pulperias
(a small shop based in someone’s
the kids.”
home, which typically sells a wide
Unlike the men, only 15 percent
variety of items, including school
of the women agreed that it was better to stay home. For example, Rosie
supplies and refreshments), and
in Managua said, “There are men who
they are almost unrepresented in the
don’t like their wives to work. Why?
skilled labor and transportation sectors (See Table 3). This is bad news
Well, perhaps the husband is jealous.
for the women because transportation Or he might feel, ‘I am the man, and
is by far the most profitable of activiyou are the woman. You have to wash,
ties, with average hourly earnings five cook, and be the maid. You have to
times that of the pulperia.
stay at home to have dinner on the
During the focus group sessions,
table when I get home and have my
many women said they choose to run
clothes ready for me. So you must
pulperias or do certain retail activistay here.’”
ties even though they are less profitIt is encouraging to note that sevable because they are located in the
eral women in the focus groups were
home. This means the women can do
willing to question men’s paternalism. It also is encouraging that most
business while still tending to their

of those same women said they feel
chauvinism and the stigma of women
working outside of their homes are
slowly fading in Nicaragua. Slowly
is the key word, and restrictions on
where and what kind of work they
can do are still important problems
for many female entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, even for those women
who are free to work outside of the
home, there are subtler inequalities
at play within the household that
often inhibit their productivity
and profitability.
HOUSEHOLD DUTIES

Gender scholars around the world
often question the notion of separate
spheres of work and home. Female
microenterpreneurs highlight this

Table 2: Monthly Income by Years of Work Experience
Monthly Net Income for
Primary Activity

Men
Women

Years of Work Experience
< 1 year

1-3 years

4-6 years

7-10 years

> 10 years

NA

$263

$274

$314

$276

$229

$255

$198

$243

$233


point because they often live in both
realms at the same time. For example,
in her study of women working
in Harare’s markets in Zimbabwe,
Chamlee-Wright (2002) notes that
women must take on a disproportion-

Female microentrepreneurs in India
are also expected to be at home, thus
limiting their access to the market
and lowering their productivity
(Kantor 2002). Cheston and Kuhn
(2002) pithily summarize all this

Table 3: Economic Activities
Economic Activity

Monthly Net
Men

Women

Net Income

Retail [1]

44%

48%

$385

Pulperia

8%

24%

$215

Manufacturing [2]

11%

6%

$422

Services

12%

20%

$292

Transportation

13%

1%

$424

Skilled labor

12%

1%

$275

100%

100%

[1] There also are important differences in the types of retail activities men and women do. For women,
the most common retail activity is clothing, which also has the lowest monthly net income of all retail
activities (US$220). For men, the most common retail activity is selling meat and dairy products,
which earns an average net income more than double that of clothing (US$467).
[2] As with retail, for manufacturing there are important differences in the types of activities men and
women do. Seventy-one percent of women in manufacturing are making clothes, which also earns the
lowest monthly net income of all the manufacturing activities (US$130). Men’s manufacturing activities
are more evenly distributed, but the most common activity is furniture, which on average earns US$221
per month.

ate share of household duties while
at the same time maintaining their
business.
Findings from other studies
around the world offer supporting
evidence. For example, Lloyd-Evans
and Potter (2002) emphasize the
detriment of household responsibilities many times throughout their
book about female entrepreneurs in
Trinidad. Espinal and Grasmuck’s
(1997) survey of microentrepreneurs
in the Dominican Republic is also
revealing; when asked if household
responsibilities impeded female businesses, only 12 percent of men said
yes, but 50 percent of women agreed.
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evidence when they assert that in
many countries “women’s businesses
remain small … because of the time
constraints that women’s domestic
responsibilities create.”
This appears to be the case in
Nicaragua, as well. In the focus
groups, more than 50 percent of the
women said they do at least some of
the housework—compared to only
13 percent of the men. One third of
women do it all alone—compared to
none of the men—but the women
still work the same number of hours
as men in their business. Clearly,
this can be a great constraint on the
women’s businesses.

In addition to household chores,
there is the discussion of household
expenses. Quantitatively, the men
and women in my focus groups share
the burden of household expenses
equally. However, it is important
to note that the women
more often pay for food
and other daily provisions
while the men pay for
utilities. Thus, even though
expenses are shared equally,
the wife is the one who has
to make payments more
frequently to meet her
family’s needs; the electricity and water bills can be
paid monthly or quarterly,
but children need to eat
daily. This means women
need a steady income,
which appears to sway their
business decisions toward
more reliable but less
lucrative endeavors,
like pulperias.
The women’s responsibility for daily expenses
also means it is more difficult for them to separate
home and work, which
often compromises their
loan investment in favor of the family’s immediate needs. In my focus
groups, half of the women and only
one of the men used at least some of
their recent loan for household consumption (e.g., food, medicine, and
school supplies). In short, men are
freer to concentrate on growing their
businesses while women were more
likely to use some of their loans for
familial purposes.
CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

My data show that gender ideology
and gender roles discourage and
inhibit women from optimizing their

research

human capital in activities that would
yield optimal returns. Meanwhile,
women’s contributions at home
generally are not reciprocated by men.
Many women express their frustration with this situation; men are
generally less inclined to see women’s
roles outside of the home as proper or
even feasible nor are they willing to
contribute more at home to support
female entrepreneurship.
These findings beget important
recommendations for practitioners
and policy makers. For the former,
MFIs must be keenly aware of the
cultural environment in which they
are operating, and they must be
resourceful in advocating for changes
that might remove cultural constraints
that inhibit women from realizing
their full potential as entrepreneurs.
For example, some MFIs and NGOs
have encouraged women to work in
traditionally male sectors. In fact, the
men in one of my focus groups told
me of a local all-female carpenters’
cooperative. Although many of these
men labelled themselves machistas,
they were quite impressed with the
co-op and sincerely admired those
women. Khan (1999) tells a similar
story of a successful BRAC-financed
textile mill employing women
microentrepreneurs in Bangladesh.
Other MFIs include codes of conduct
and training sessions designed to
empower their female borrowers. Most
importantly, each MFI should design
strategies that are effective but also
culturally appropriate.
But the burden of change cannot
rest only on the MFIs. Promoting
nontraditional work for women will
not alleviate their undue share of
household responsibilities. Broader
cultural changes are needed, which is
beyond any MFI. For policy makers,
perhaps the most important lesson is
not to use microcredit as a substitute

for other programs that empower
women. Microcredit is just one of
many initiatives that can challenge
unfair gender norms. Governments
should complement microcredit
programs by funding other initiatives to promote gender awareness
and fairness.
Microcredit alone will not necessarily improve women’s lives; it might
make matters worse by adding to
women’s responsibilities and workloads. But sincere efforts to change
unfair gender norms throughout
society will maximize the impact of
microcredit. Realizing this goal will
be tantamount to millions of women
worldwide realizing their full potential as entrepreneurs.
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Innovation
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Growth

Product innovations are different and specific to MFIs, but all focus on one feature:
they are all geared toward providing a wider range of financial products and intermediation
options. These innovations are the launching pad and competitive advantage for
MFIs, but most people are confused about these innovations.

By Jasmine Mohanty and Debadut ta K. Panda

N

ew microfinance institutions have demonstrated
slow pace in coming to
India. They’ve felt constraints from
low levels of grants, an unfavorable
policy environment, substantial traditional banking infrastructure, and
a lack of context-specific solutions.
Even existing microfinance service
providers are quite limited in total
outreach because of late entry and
little field work.
Indian banks are becoming
increasingly more conscious of the
potential of microcredit, however,
and they have started to compete
with MFIs. For instance, they’ve
started lending to self-help groups

(SHGs). NGOs initiated lending to
SHGs in the mid 1980s. In 1992, the
National Bank for Agriculture and
Rural Development (NABARD) and
the Reserve Bank of India recognized
the benefits of SHGs and launched
a pilot project to link five hundred
SHGs with banks.
Now, the microfinance market
in India covers approximately 75
million potential poor households
and is the largest in the world. The
average household demand varies
from Rs2000 to Rs6000 (US$50 to
US$150) in rural areas and Rs9000
(US$224) in urban settings. Eighty
percent of the clients are from rural
areas, and the total credit demand

varies between Rs225 billion to
Rs500 billion (US$5.6 billion to
US$12 billion).
Many MFIs fill the gap between
the supply and the demand for
microfinance in India. These MFIs
are classified as:
• NGOs engaged in promoting
SHGs and linking them with banks.
• NGOs directly lending to borrowers who are either organized into
SHGs or into groups and centers.
These NGOs borrow bulk funds from
various donors.
• MFIs specifically organized as
cooperatives.
• MFIs organized as nonbanking
finance companies.

research

The effective product penetration
into remote areas and distribution to
a large number of clients was due to
two important innovations: (1) the
individual counseling of clients by
MFI/NGO staff and (2) the designing of an income generation activity
or business plan by the client with
MFI/NGO support. An example of
MFI innovations in microfinance
comes from Adhikar, operating in
Orrisa and working with local tribes.
Adhikar helped bring nontimber forest products into SHGs and linked
the SHGs to microfinance without
physical collateral. It also set up
an organization of migrants and
provided credit and saving services
through cooperatives, using remittances along with savings as an
entry-point activity.

• • • •
i nnovat ions b y m fi s

The 1990s witnessed the SHG
revolution. SHGs were seen as a tool
for initiating a developmental and
livelihood project. NGO-based MFIs
rapidly introduced of a range of savings and credit products to expand
their microcredit clientele. NGOs
were governed by grants, and parts of
those grants percolated as a grant for
SHGs. The major focus at the time
was to initiate internal savings rather
than have a provision of external
credit. The external credit was generally covered by a grant from an NGO
or a loan from a commercial, nationalized bank with the support of more
than six months of internal saving. In
this system, the provision of the grant
or loan targeted the group rather than
individual clients.
The scenario was changed by the
invasion of new generation MFIs in
the early 2000s. Credit became the
main theme, and individual clientele

became the main focus. Rural financial products like credit and insurance
dominated as the conventional saving
style. The main difference between
the two systems was the way people’s
savings were viewed. Although the new
financial services were more flexible and
tailored closely to the preferences of
the clients, many people felt that a loan
from an MFI should come without
interest, as in the former system.
Product innovations are different
and specific to MFIs, but all focus on
one feature: they are all geared toward
providing a wider range of financial
products and intermediation options.
These innovations are the launching
pad and competitive advantage for
MFIs, but most people are confused
about these innovations.
Self-Help Groups
During 2004, mainstream MFIs
expanded from female SHGs to
include male SHGs in order to scale
up the business; these male SHGs
had a higher credit disbursal and a
regular repayment rate. One reason
for the continued success is that the
loan was used to support an existing
business. One problem in this model
is that the male SHG benefits the
business group while the responsibility is individual, the loan is individual, and the repayment is individual.
Structuring Repayment Schedule
The change from a pre-active to an
active SHG movement is certainly
a result of product innovation and
product customization in the microfinance sector. MFIs now design the
repayment schedules according to the
income realization pattern of the clients. Different repayment schedules
are structured for different clients,
and the portfolio at risk is minimized
at higher scale. The mainstream
MFIs used to commission indepen-

dent impact studies to discover the
missing links and loopholes, thereby
increasing product customization
and innovation.
Partnership and Intercollaboration
of MFIs
In 2002, BASIX and Aviva jointly
designed a group life insurance product to provide life insurance to all
BASIX credit customers, where the
sum insured was up to 150 percent of
the loan amount. BASIX entered into
agency relationships in December
2003 with nonclients too. Thus, the
local area bank, KBS, which was a
part of the BASIX group, could offer
life insurance to all deposit holders
of the bank. For livestock and health
insurance, BASIX worked with Royal
Sundaram. It started the distribution of livestock insurance in 2002,
worked with the insurance company
toward product and process simplification, and began to offer health
insurance to all its credit customers. BASIX, in collaboration with
ICICI Lombard and with technical
assistance from the Commodity Risk
Management of the World Bank,
piloted the sale of rainfall-indexed
weather insurance to 230 farmers
during the monsoon season of 2003.
Within a span of three years, this
pilot program has become a full-scale
weather insurance program.
Economies of scale and imaginative uses of technology and effective innovations have brought costs
and interest rates down for MFIs.
Analyzing and understanding the vast
opportunity, many MFIs plan to offer
more microfinancial products to both
rural and urban households. These
include additional loan products,
such as housing, auto, and education;
new insurance schemes for health,
life, and assets; and unique services
like remittances.
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Reduction of the cost of bad debt
is achieved by intercollaboration of
MFIs. For example, BASIX has collaborated with local, grass-root level
NGOs, agribusiness firms, and commercial financial institutions. These
partners have better informal information about the potential borrowers
and a clearer understanding of the
borrower’s repayment history.
ICICI Bank, the second-largest
private commercial bank in India, has
aggressively doubled its rural microfinance and agribusiness loan portfolio
over a period of nine months. The outstanding portfolio in the group’s total
rural microfinance and agribusiness
portfolio nearly doubled between 2005
and 2006. This success comes from an
outreach of 3.2 million low-income clients. Simultaneously, the bank has also
increased its partner strength of MFIs
from 49 in 2005 to 102 in 2006. The
bank ultimately plans to partner with
200 to 250 MFIs, each serving three
districts in the country.

T

ICICI’s microfinance portfolio has
increased from ten thousand microfinance clients in 2001 to 1.2 million
clients in 2006 through its partner
MFIs, and its outstanding portfolio
has increased from Rs0.20 billion to
Rs9.98 billion (US$4.9 million to
US$248 million). The rapid growth
of ICICI was due to its partnership
model of action where: (1) the MFI
acts as a collection agency instead of
financial intermediary. Microloans are
contracted directly between the bank
and the clients so the risk for the
MFI is separated from the risk inherent in the portfolio; and (2) the bank
secures microfinance portfolios before
entering into a partnership.
Securitization
Microfinance became a priority sector
for banks due to high risk-adjusted
returns, and many banks—private
and government—partnered with
MFIs under diverse innovative models. One of these innovations is assess-

he innovations in the microfinance sector have made a
dramatic change in the supply of credit to the neediest,
neglected sector by formal financial institutions. Now, the
microfinance market in India covers approximately 75 million
potential poor households and is the largest in the world.

• • • •
C ONC LUSI ON

The innovations in the microfinance sector have made a dramatic
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ing and buying out microfinance debt
through the process of securitization.
Microloan securitization benefits
MFIs in several ways. It decreases financial products to interested investors,
like other banks that can register such a
security as a priority-sector investment.
In a securitization deal, the MFI is still
responsible for collecting the microloans from its clients but the risk of
repayment default is not backed by any
of the MFI’s assets. As collateral, the
bank uses a first-loss, default guarantee
financed by either the excess spread on
the MFI portfolio or by a third party.
In 2004, the largest securitization deal in microfinance was signed
between ICICI Bank and SHARE
Microfin Ltd, a large MFI operating in rural areas of India. Under
this agreement, ICICI purchased
SHARE Microfin Ltd’s portfolio and
resold it as a package in the SHARE
deal. ICICI had purchased a part
of SHARE’s microfinance portfolio
against a consideration calculated
by computing the net present value
of receivables amounting to Rs215
million (US$5.3 million) at an agreed
discount rate. The interest paid by
SHARE is almost 4 percent less than
the rate paid in commercial loans.
Partial credit provision was provided
by SHARE in the form of a guarantee
amounting to 8 percent of the receivables under the portfolio, by way of a
lien on fixed deposit. This deal frees
up equity capital, allowing SHARE
to scale up its lending. On the other
hand, it allows ICICI Bank to reach
new markets, and by trading assets of
high quality in capital markets, the
bank can hedge its own risks.

change in the supply of credit to
the neediest, neglected sector by
formal financial institutions. The
most important innovation that has
come up is that societal upliftment
and social development are no longer
grant based. People have realized
that the formal credit is more flexible
and yielding than grants. The most
important impact of this innovation
is the development of confidence
among the poor and their realization
to grow according to their own plan
rather than the grant provider.
According to the 2005 impact
assessment study of NABARD and
GTZ, the average loan per SHG
member nearly doubled between
1998 and 2005. In the same period,

the average portion of borrowed
funds used for production purposes
increased from 72 percent to 85
percent, and the portion of the loan
used for consumption purposes came
down from 28 percent to 15 percent.
The portion of loans borrowed from
moneylenders with high interest rates
significantly decreased from 42 percent of the total loan amount to 3 percent. Also, the overall loan repayment
by members of the SHG improved
from 84 percent to 94 percent.
These achievements of microfinance
programs in India, and probably
similarly around the world,
are largely due to the continued
innovation and customization of
financial products.
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Trade-offs between

Social & Financial

Performance
BY Gary Woller

True or False: Trade-offs occur between social performance and financial performance
in microfinance. Conventional wisdom says true. Extending formal financial services
to poor and hard-to-reach clientele necessarily entails higher costs and lower per unit
returns and is, subsequently, harder to scale up. The trade-off inherent in this relationship
creates incentives for microfinance institutions (MFIs) to move up-market and away from
their traditional poor clientele—a phenomenon known as mission drift.

But as is often the case, conventional wisdom does not
necessarily represent reality, since it frequently draws
from personal bias and limited anecdotal experience.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the relationship
between social and financial performance is actually
more complex than imagined, and evidence exists to suggest that the relationship is not always negative. In some
cases, particularly in ones relating to social performance
management (SPM), the relationship may actually be
significantly positive.
The nature of the relationship also depends critically
on how one defines social performance. In practice, social
performance entails more than poverty outreach or poverty impact. Once we allow for a more expanded definition, it opens up possibilities in which the two can work
in concert with each other.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Microfinance is unique among development approaches
in that it offers the potential for both massive scale and
operational sustainability. Perhaps more than any other
development or humanitarian strategy, microfinance offers
a diverse group of stakeholders a real opportunity to “do
well by doing good.” Microfinance combines the ethos
and practices of development with the ethos and practices
of capitalism to provide, potentially, hundreds of millions
of persons with vital services necessary to increase their
labor productivity, smooth consumption, manage risks
and withstand shocks, and build social capital. Or so goes
the popular thinking.
Things are, once again, a bit more complicated in
practice. One thing that appears almost certain is that
microfinance is a victim of excessive hype. Dozens of

impact studies find that microfinance does have significant and positive impacts, but they are substantially less
dramatic than those touted by enthusiastic microfinance
advocates. A realistic conclusion is that microfinance
should not be expected to end poverty any time soon;
there is simply no way that microfinance can live up to
the lofty expectations of its more zealous advocates.
On the positive side, we now know indisputably that
financial services constitute an integral component of the
livelihood and coping strategies of the poor. The poor
need and use financial services no less than do the wealthy.
Few people question the value of financial services in
general (Their benefits are well understood and well documented.), and few among the wealthy could imagine their
lives without access to financial services.
Given this, it might be argued that we do not need

to promise that microfinance will eliminate poverty; it
unnecessarily complicates the case by weighing it down
with unrealistic expectations and other rhetorical baggage.
A preferable approach in this case is to strip microfinance
of this baggage and focus instead on reaching as many
people possible in the least expensive way possible and in
the most sustainable way possible.
Following this argument, social impact may best be
achieved by building financially sustainable MFIs with
significant outreach. Large and sustainable MFIs, the logic
goes, are bound to pick up poor customers in their wider
net—more poor customers than some MFIs that exclusively target the poor. In this context, investing resources
in managing an MFI’s social performance, moreover, is at
best a benign distraction from the core business concerns
of scale and sustainability. At worst, it is a costly distrac15

tion that inappropriately diverts organizational resources,
with negative implications for scale and sustainability.
Others argue that discarding the antipoverty agenda
of microfinance entails risk. In particular, the quest for
scale and sustainability (i.e., profitability) will invariably
create pressures for MFIs to abandon their traditional
clientele to target easier-to-reach (less costly) and more
well-off (less risky and more profitable) clientele. The
result of this mission drift will be that the very persons
that MFIs were originally created to reach—the hard-toreach and poor—will once again be left without access to
formal financial services.
Indeed, as some survey the microfinance landscape,
they see unsettling portents. The industry has, by and
large, accepted the primary goal of financial sustainability
among industry mores and practices. Increasingly, MFIs are
adopting commercial business models (including transformation into profit-seeking, regulated institutions) and the
subsequent values. Donors, who tend to identify more with
the industry’s social roots, are increasingly giving way to
private investors who are unconnected to the sector’s social
roots and who tend to emphasize financial returns. These
developments, while good in certain important aspects,
will only increase the trend toward mission drift.
For those concerned about industry trends, the
antidote to mission drift is to keep the industry tethered
to its historical social moorings. This requires constant
attention to the social objectives of microfinance and,
critically, practical methods to manage social performance. Developing cost-effective measurement methods
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is, moreover, a necessary condition for creating social
transparency, which is in turn a necessary condition for
creating social accountability.

REASSESSING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The truth probably lies between these two stylized arguments. Still, the competing perspectives on this issue
each incorporates a set of questionable assumptions. One
of the most important assumptions is that social performance is largely defined by poverty outreach or impact.
Defining Social Performance
Defining social performance in terms of poverty outreach
is both conceptually and practically inappropriate. Social
performance may include poverty outreach, but it also
need not. The Social Performance Glossary on the SEEP
Network’s Web site, for example, defines social performance as “the effective translation of an organization’s
social mission into practice. Social performance is not
just about measuring the outcomes, but also about the
actions and corrective measures that are being taken to
bring about those outcomes.” In practice, it is entirely
feasible for an MFI to have a distinct social mission that
does not include serving the poor. An MFI might, for
example, define its social mission as “to improve the
economic well-being of persons traditionally excluded
from formal financial markets” or “to create jobs and promote enhanced social status for small and medium-sized
agro-businesses.” Neither of these two mission statements
specifically mentions the poor, and both MFIs could

One thing that appears
almost certain is that
microfinance is a victim
of excessive hype.
conceivably fulfill their social missions without reaching
a single poor person.
How does the absence of reference to the poor or
to poverty in an MFI’s social mission make its social
mission less valid? It doesn’t, nor should the MFI’s social
performance be judged relative to this standard. Rather,
its social performance should be judged, and the MFI
held accountable, for performance relative to its stated
social mission.
To carry the point further, an MFI might have no
social mission. It may exist solely to earn a profit by
targeting nontraditional customers or formerly excluded
persons, or it may position itself to compete directly with
the mainstream commercial banks in certain nonpoor
market segments. It is, again, inappropriate to hold this
MFI accountable for social outcomes that are not part of
its institutional mission. This general point is important,
so it deserves emphasizing: Social performance is a broad
concept of which poverty outreach is one component—
an admittedly important component, but one component
nonetheless.
Social Performance as Core Business Activity
I now turn to the assertion that social performance is a
distraction from core business activities. Whether this is
true depends to a large extent on the mission of the MFI
in question. If the MFI claims a distinct social mission, it
is hard to see how dealing purposively with this mission
constitutes a distraction. This does not imply that the
MFI needs to devote x amount of effort to managing its
social performance, but it does imply that it needs to
devote some effort, particularly if it solicits funding on
the basis of this mission.
Even if one is committed to the concept of social
performance, MFIs historically have not been held
accountable for it for the simple reason that there was
no cost-effective way to measure it. To date, MFIs have
been able to opt out of measuring and reporting their
social performance with more or less impunity.

This is no longer, or will soon no longer be, the case,
however. Recent years have seen a number of technological innovations in measuring social performance
that overcome the cost barriers and that promise costeffective collection and reporting of social performance
information. These include development and emerging
consensus on critical social performance indicators, the
development of tools such as the social rating and social
audit, and the integration of methods borrowed from
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement in
the private sector.
The Business Case for Social Performance
Researchers have produced over one hundred studies
examining the empirical relationship between social and
financial performance. The findings are mixed across the
entire range of studies, but there do exist distinct trends
in the findings suggesting a significant and positive
relationship between social and financial performance.
A caveat to these studies is that they were done among private firms engaging in CSR, so the results are unlikely to
translate directly to microfinance. At the very least, they
serve to rebut any general argument that paying attention
to one’s social performance constitutes an inappropriate
and potentially dangerous diversion from the pursuit of
making money.
There are several ways to explain these positive findings.
The actual causal factors linking social and financial performance are likely a combination of them, plus other factors.
• The instrumental stakeholder theory suggests that the
satisfaction of various stakeholder groups is instrumental
for organizational financial performance.
• The stakeholder–agency theory argues that the relationship between stakeholders serves as a monitoring mechanism that prevents managers from diverting attention
from broad organizational financial goals. By addressing
and balancing the claims of multiple stakeholders, mangers can increase the efficiency of their organization’s
adaptation to external demands.
• Slack resources theory proposes that prior financial
performance is directly associated with subsequent social
performance because prior high levels of financial performance may provide the slack resources necessary to
engage in SPM.
• Firm-as-contract theory stipulates that high firm
performance results from the simultaneous coordination
and prioritization of multiple stakeholder interests, in
addition to separate satisfaction of bilateral relationships.
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Table 1: Selected Financial and Social Performance Indicators for Banks, NBFIs, and NGOs
Institution Type

Borrowers

Profit Margin

Return on Equity

Average Loan
Size / GNI per
Capita

Banks

53,922

16.7

112

8.4

91.6

NBFIs

14,345

9.1

110

5.2

65.0

NGOs

16,193

10.8

112

10.5

23.5

.org/resource_centers/socialperformance/.

may help build a positive image with customers, investors,
and suppliers. Firms with high social performance can
use social performance disclosures as one of the information signals on which stakeholders base their assessments
of firm reputation. Firms with high social performance
reputations may also improve relationships with bankers
and investors, or they may also attract better employees or
increase employees’ goodwill—all of which help improve
financial performance.
The purpose here is not to establish definitively a
positive relationship between social and financial performance but to provide sufficient evidence to establish the
empirical plausibility of this relationship. In the worst
case, there appears to be no harm to SPM, and in the best
case, there appears to be significant financial benefit.

SPM helps firms develop new internal competencies,
resources, and capabilities that become embedded in the
firm’s culture, technology, structure, and human resources.
• Within so-called high density networks, SPM
improves a firm’s competitive advantage by improving
management’s ability to weigh and address the multiple
and often competing claims of stakeholders in a fair and
rational manner.
• Where social performance is preemptive and a firm’s
environment is dynamic or complex, SPM may help build
management competencies because preventative efforts
of this nature require significant employee participation,
firm-wide coordination, and a forward-thinking management style. In such cases, SPM can help management
develop better scanning skills, internal processes, and
information systems, which in turn increase the organization’s capacity to manage external changes, turbulence,
and crisis.
• According to reputation theory, a firm’s communication with external stakeholders about social performance

Conventional Wisdom vs. Practice
How does the presumed trade-off between social and
financial performance play out in the context of microfinance? Table 1 offers preliminary evidence to suggest,
once again, that the conventional wisdom may be simplistic. It presents average figures from the April 2007 issue of
The MicroBanking Bulletin comparing end-of-year values
in 2005 for selected performance measures at commercial banks, nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs), and
NGOs. NBFIs are for-profit, regulated financial institutions operating under different supervisory standards than
the commercial banks. NGOs typically operate with a
greater development, or social, focus than banks or NBFIs,
and they will tend to work with a poorer and more marginal clientele.
As expected, the commercial banks have on average
significantly more borrowers than the NGOs, confirming
that there is a trade-off between social focus and scale. In
contrast, the average loan size relative to gross national
income per capita is significantly smaller among NGOs,
confirming the conventional wisdom that NGOs tend
to work with poorer clients. (Average loan size is a very

The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP) and the Ford Foundation are spearheading a stakeholder engagement process called
the Social Performance Task Force. Their goal
is to coordinate work on social performance
assessment (SPA) and social performance
management (SPM) in the microfinance sector. Information on the Task Force and other
initiatives in social performance is available
on the Social Performance Resource Center’s
Web site: http://www.microfinancegateway
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rough proxy of poverty outreach based on the intuitive
assumption of an inverse relationship between income
and loan size.)
In terms of financial performance, however, the
conventional wisdom is not a good guide. Commercial
banks do not consistently outperform the NGOs across
the financial performance categories. Banks earn higher
profit margins on average, but NGOs earn a higher return
on equity on average; yet there is no difference between
the two in terms of financial self-sufficiency. Also, the forprofit NBFIs consistently do worse than the NGOs in all
five performance categories.
Far from showing a clear financial advantage for commercial banks, Table 1 seems to suggest that NGOs can
serve a poorer clientele while still earning returns comparable with commercial banks and superior to NBFIs.

CONCLUSION
The conventional wisdom asserts an inverse relationship between social performance and financial performance. I’ve outlined three reasons why the conventional
wisdom in this case is simplistic or even wrong. First, the
conventional wisdom largely defines social performance
in terms of poverty outreach. In practice, however, social
performance is a much broader concept of which poverty
outreach is but one dimension. A broader definition of
social performance makes evident any number of alternative scenarios in which social and financial performance
need not be in conflict and may even be complementary.
Second, the preponderance of empirical evidence
taken from the private sector points to a positive and
significant relationship between financial and social
performance. All else equal, firms that actively manage
their social performance earn higher financial returns than
otherwise. Doing social performance management, apparently, yields a variety of benefits that translate into higher
financial returns, such as improved stakeholder relations,
greater management capacity, improved internal capacities, better inter-firm communication, improved employee
relations, and enhanced reputation. While the empirical
findings in the private sector may not translate directly to
microfinance, neither is the microfinance sector so different that the findings are not relevant to it.
Third, preliminary evidence in microfinance fails to
show a systematic inverse relationship between social (or
poverty) orientation and financial performance. Overall,
microfinance NGOs perform similarly to, or better than,
commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions on
critical financial performance indicators. This evidence is

far from conclusive, but there is, at the very least, sufficient contrary examples to suggest that the relationship
between social and financial performance is by no means
set. The exact form of the relationship depends on the situation. A strong social orientation need not result in the
sacrifice of financial return. Conversely, a strong financial
orientation need not result in the sacrifice of social return.
What is the answer to the question of trade-offs
between financial and social performance? It depends on
the situation. There may be a trade-off; there may not be.
Digging a bit deeper in these numbers uncovers examples
of large, sustainable MFIs that serve more poor clients
and do so more profitably than poverty-focused MFIs
operating in the same markets. But there are also large,
sustainable MFIs serving very few poor people, fewer
than poverty-focused MFIs operating in the same markets.
There are also some very large MFIs exclusively focused on
poverty. Scale and sustainability do not guarantee poverty outreach, but a poverty focus does not rule out scale
or sustainability. Conversely, a poverty focus does not
guarantee poverty outreach; but scale and sustainability
can promote it. It is hard to generalize. A more thorough
analysis of the data might yet reveal some general trends,
but within these general trends, there are bound to be
numerous exceptions. The reader is well-advised to be
wary of simple generalizations and the simplified policy
prescriptions that might flow from them.
In any case, there is reason to believe that MFIs can
produce reasonably good financial performance even if
they target poorer or harder-to-reach clientele. It may or
may not be equal to what the MFI could earn in other
market segments, but it is neither desirable nor feasible
for every MFI to target the same market and the same
clientele. There is ample room for different MFIs to target
different market segments and, within these market segments, generate “good” financial returns.
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Mission Drift—
Understand It, Avoid It
By James Co p e s t a k e • i l l u s t r a t i o n s b y t y l e r p a c k

M

icrofinance is a potentially powerful tool to fight
poverty and help poor people raise their income,
accumulate assets, and cushion themselves against
external shocks. At the same time leaders of the movement recognize the need for a hard-nosed commercial
outlook if it is to be sustainable. To this end many specialized microfinance providers have formalized and scaled up
their activities while, in the other direction, many regulated financial institutions have expanded downstream.
Good reasons exist to welcome a boundary blur
between microfinance and mainstream banking. Only
with commercial capital can demand for financial services
among poorer people be more fully met. Closer integration also promotes innovation and greater responsiveness
to the diverse client needs. However, the danger that
commercialization of microfinance will lead to an overpreoccupation with profitability at the expense of poverty
reduction and other development goals is great—mission
drift is an ever-present possibility for MFIs and often
irreversible.
Because microfinance is motivated by development
as well as economic goals, the question arises how best
to evaluate performance against multiple and potentially
conflicting goals. The main issue is not so much the
desirability of broader performance measurement but
its feasibility. Technical performance management “by
numbers” is difficult under the best of circumstances;
measuring the impact of microfinance institutions using
even crude estimates of household income is technically
difficult, expensive, and perhaps better left to independent
researchers who can do it more rigorously. However, the
potential of microfinance as a development tool will only
be realized if financial institutions systematically and rou-

tinely measure performance, and if they do it in response
to internal demand, not in response to pressure from
other organizations.

KEY CONCEPTS
Three key dimensions of social performance are breadth
of outreach (the number of people using services during
any period of time), depth of outreach (the social status
of clients at the beginning of any period), and impact (the
net benefits to clients and those indirectly affected by
their use of financial services). Financial performance is
primarily the percentage of the service’s full cost that is
directly paid for by the users.
Innovations that reduce the costs of providing
services bring improvement in both financial and social
performance. But other decisions entail a trade-off over
time between them. For example, raising interest rates on
loans is likely to improve financial performance (assuming inelastic demand) but at the expense of current social
performance (due to reduced net benefit per client and
possible short-term reduction in breadth and depth of
outreach). Most benefits of trade-offs only come over time
because future social performance depends on both current social performance and on how financial performance
affects the capacity to supply services in the future.
Another example is the growth rate of the MFI. Many
MFIs have emphasized the prime importance of serving
more clients through growth. The cost of investing in
new capacity has a negative financial effect in the short
term, but this may eventually be offset by economies of
scale. Improved financial performance is also necessary for
growth in order to mobilize resources; therein lies the case
for lowering current social performance to enhance future
21

social performance. In contrast, other
MFIs have opted for a slower growth
strategy: putting greater emphasis on
current depth of outreach and impact.
Such decisions reflect variation in
time horizons and, more importantly,
path-dependent judgments about how
current performance is likely to affect
future social performance opportunities.
Figure 1 provides a graphical
framework to aid thinking about such
strategic “win-win” options and tradeoffs between financial and social
performance. The preferences of the
MFI, or its mission, are represented
by a set of indifference curves (C1,
C2, and C3). The top preference is at
the top right corner of the box, since
this is the point at which both social
and financial performance are at their
highest. Conversely, the lowest preference is at the bottom left corner. The
indifference curves each represent a
set of points whose current social and
financial performances are equally
attractive. Movement upward and to
22
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the right, or to a higher indifference
curve, thus represents a move to a
preferred level of overall performance.
From any given initial level of
actual performance (pt), an MFI
is limited in how it can change its
position within the next time period.
Line PPt+1 reflects this room to
maneuver and is determined by the
scope for policy change, operational
reforms, investments, innovations
and growth. Change possibilities
over one period are illustrated by
the five arrows:
1. The horizontal arrow represents
a growth-first strategy, subject to the
rule that current social performance
should not get any worse.
2. The vertical arrow represents a
current clients-first strategy, subject to
the rule that financial performance
should not get any worse.
3. The arrow pointing upward
and to the right represents an intermediate strategy. Assuming the MFI
is successful in reaching the PPt+1

line, then this strategy is optimal; in
the case shown, it is pt+1*.
4. The arrow moving up and to
the left represents a trade-off strategy
of improved current social performance at the expense of financial
performance.
5. The downward sloping arrow
also represents a trade-off strategy—this time to enhance financial
performance by reducing current
social performance.
In addition to illustrating strategic
options, the diagram clarifies the reality
of mission drift: an unplanned or hidden change in preferences and resulting
behaviors. Mission drift is, at the heart,
a response to past performance—less
rational than a conscious change in
preferences but more than ignorant of
actual performance outcomes.
As an example, assume that an
MFI takes actions intended to take
it from point pt to pt+1*, but actually ends up at pt+1#. This in itself is
better described as mission failure
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performance outcomes rather than
being a fixed point against which performance can be guided and assessed.

APPLIC A T I O N
Since an important key to avoid mission drift is an accurate assessment of
performance, this section blends the
framework presented above with our
research experience with nonprofit
MFIs through the Imp-Act program.
We follow this discussion with other
lessons we have learned regarding
organizational leadership among
successful MFIs.
Revising Social Performance Assessment
Three broad points of consensus
emerged from our research as to
what any system of social performance assessment should include.
First, MFIs with an explicit poverty
mission should routinely monitor breadth and depth of outreach.
Although it was not possible to
agree on a standard set of indicators
for this, there was methodological
convergence between many MFIs
and their sponsors to adopt a combination of proxy poverty indicators.

Leaders in the field use a simple
but transparent scorecard calibrated
against national household survey
data and poverty estimates.
Second, MFIs should routinely
monitor client exit and turnover. If
clients choose not to leave and are not
hoodwinked or coerced into using
services, then this is a useful indication that the impact of the services is
less likely to be negative. It follows
that outreach data should, at the very
least, be supplemented by statistics
on exit, including routine reports on
why clients leave—particularly those
who only recently joined and whose
understanding of the terms of service
could have been inadequate.
Third, MFIs should invest in
capacity to assess progress toward
social goals by giving voice to loyal
clients too, through appropriate market and impact research.
Questionnaire-based surveys, semistructured interviews of key informants, and focus groups—all with
the priority to test, update, and
augment existing organizational
knowledge of clients’ experiences
rather than to provide rigorous proof
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than mission drift. From this new
starting point it is unlikely the MFI
would continue to aim for pt+1* in
the second period—pt+1* might even
fall completely outside any realistic
assessment of what is possible. In
such a situation, choosing a new
target outcome for the next period
without a change in underlying preferences is better described as pragmatism than mission drift.
At the opposite extreme, an
MFI could redefine its preferences
in order to provide a retrospective
rationalization of the actual performance outcome. In this example,
the MFI could express a stronger
preference for financial performance over social performance
(i.e., making the indifference curves
steeper until p t+1# becomes the optimal target rather than pt+1*). This
is closer to the idea of mission drift,
but it would also be a case of selfserving opportunism and is better
regarded as a special case.
A general definition of mission
drift is that the steps taken to achieve
a given performance outcome directly
induce changes in preferences.
Managers use current performance to
reset their desires and preferences for
what is possible in the future; they
change the shape and slope of the
indifference curves to reflect what
they see as the new reality.
In a mythical world of perfect
information, the directors of an
MFI would set performance goals,
the managers would make decisions
to achieve them, employees would
systematically monitor outcomes, and
everyone would learn. Unfortunately,
leaders of MFIs are handicapped
by the lack of timely and reliable
evidence about performance. Mission
drift occurs when their goals and
preferences for the future subconsciously change in response to actual
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Imp-Act stands for “Improving the Impact
of Microfinance on Poverty: An ActionResearch Program” and was sponsored
by the Ford Foundation. It was launched
in 2000 to explore ways of improving
the measurement and management of
poverty reduction by MFIs. Twenty-two
organizations successfully bid for support
to carry out their own action-research
over a three-year period, ending in April
2004. These comprised sixteen direct
providers of microfinance services, three
NGO promoters of user-controlled savings
and credit groups, and three MFI networks.
One premise of the program was that
debate over the social performance of
MFIs was dominated by external interests
(e.g., governments, donors, and researchers) at the expense of MFIs themselves.
Participants were therefore given freedom
to explore ways of improving their social
performance assessment systems to meet
their own needs rather than externallydictated ends. For more information, see
Copestake, Greeley, Johnson, Kabeer, and
Simanowitz’s book, Money with a Mission,
Volume 1: Microfinance and Poverty
Reduction, published in 2005 by ITDG
Publications. Or visit www.imp-act.org.

of impact—can accomplish
such purposes.
Returning to the theoretical
framework summarized by Figure
1, these practical lessons amount
to defining the Y-axis (social performance) as the number of active
users adjusted for loyalty and client
satisfaction (as a proxy of service
quality) and poverty status (with
greater weight given to poorer or otherwise disadvantaged clients). Social
performance is improved by serving more clients, by serving poorer
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clients, by broadening the range of
services they receive, by serving them
for longer periods, and by ensuring
that services do no harm. While this
definition falls well short of capturing
all aspects of an MFI’s social mission
(e.g., community-wide impact), it
does provide a baseline for assessment.
Performance Possibilities
Without denying the scope for managerial wizardry, the major determinants of financial performance are
well understood: realistic pricing of
products (particularly interest rates),
strong cost control and productivity enhancement, risk and liquidity management, portfolio quality
control, and continual innovation in
response to customer requirements
and market conditions. The key
question concerns how much scope
MFIs have to systematically improve
social performance while handling
these financial pressures. Our analysis
of MFIs participating in the Imp-Act
program highlighted four areas.
First, targeting has a critical bearing on depth of outreach. Serving
geographically defined poorer areas
does not necessarily mean lower profits because such areas may have limited competition, but it often results
in significantly increased depth of
outreach. Some MFIs directly target
poorer clients by using a poverty
means test instead of focusing solely
on geography. This is more controversial; deliberately excluding better-off
clients can reduce opportunities for
cross-subsidization and growth and
can weaken an MFI’s competitiveness.
But as with geographical targeting,
such targeting can also help an MFI
to develop its comparative advantage
in a specific market segment. Small
Enterprise Foundation in South
Africa is a particularly interesting
example because it operates poverty-

targeted and non-poverty-targeted
services alongside each other. This
enables it to vary the balance between
social and financial performance
goals through strategic reallocation
of resources between them.
Second, an even more powerful,
yet indirect, targeting mechanism is
product design. Most MFIs began
by replicating products pioneered by
others—solidarity loans of Grameen
Bank or village banking services
on the FINCA model, for example.
However, most have become more
flexible, have diversified their services,
and often have simplified product
terms and conditions. These changes
exert a powerful influence not only
on profitability but also on the kinds
of clients attracted and the extent to
which clients benefit.
Third, internal organizational
changes (e.g., front-line staff recruitment, training, and performance
incentive systems) are critical.
Performance contracts that seek
to align financial rewards of staff
to those of the MFI have become
standard practice, but better social
performance assessment (particularly
of staff- and branch-wise exit rates)
creates opportunities for aligning
staff incentives to social goals as well.
Social performance management can
significantly improve staff motivation,
retention, and productivity.
Fourth, an MFI’s room to maneuver depends upon their operating
environment—particularly the extent
of unrealized demand, opportunities
for innovation, the extent of regulation, and access to different forms of
finance. While individual MFIs have
little influence over these changes,
the range and quality of the external
relationships they forge with other
commercial and non-commercial
organizations is a critical determinant
of their social performance. In many
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countries a scissors-like combination
of increased competition and more
stringent terms of aid have reduced
short-term room for maneuvering,
forcing more radical cost-saving
innovations. While MFIs compete
with each other, they also collaborate
extensively through both informal
and formal networks. They seek flexible financial and technical support
from donors and governments but are
also wary of being overly controlled
by them. Strong financial performance and a good understanding
of the wider financial system have
opened up opportunities for some to
mobilize equity and finance debt to
permit faster growth.
Although the very existence of
MFIs may be a symptom of the
mainstream financial system’s limited
outreach, the quality of an MFI’s
relationship with it nevertheless
remains critical to its performance.
Meanwhile, donors and specialist
intermediaries provide MFIs with
financial and technical support that
can help soften the trade-off between
growth and depth and quality of
outreach. The main challenge facing
MFIs is to make good use of such
support without becoming overly
dependent on it or allowing it to
undermine their financial discipline
and autonomy. Performance possibilities or strategic options faced by
MFIs may have narrowed somewhat
due to increased competition and
tougher terms of donor funding, but
they remain substantial.
Leadership Implications
Our Imp-Act program research
revealed that mission and vision
statements covered all aspects of
outreach, but that their significance
depends on how much weight MFI
leaders and boards actually attach to
them in decision making. Tension

often exists between board members and senior managers—those
with stronger commercial business
or banking backgrounds and those
with stronger social or volunteering
backgrounds, respectively.
The phenomenon of mission drift
is also manifest in these terms. The
appointment of those with more
commercial experience in a quest for
improved financial performance may
be seen by other board members as
a means to improve long-term social
performance, but leaves open the
question whether they will be able to
retain control. In the case of MFIs
aiming for transformation into commercial banks, new board members
also bring financial responsibilities
to commercial investors and private
for-profit shareholders. These changes
can become self-reinforcing if newcomers also perpetuate further the
simplistic understanding of the nature
of poverty (i.e., simply a lack of access
to credit). In terms of Figure 1, such
drift takes the form of a cumulative
flattening of the indifference curves.
Larger MFIs have been able to
avoid such danger by combining the
acquisition of financial expertise with
sustained investment in improving
and updating internal understanding
of the nature of poverty at all levels of
the organization. This can be harder
for smaller MFIs for whom the bigger
danger may be more mission lock-in
than drift—being unable to control
or limit the process of commercializa-

tion once it has started. Leaders also
have a vested interest in lack of transparency about social performance
to the extent that uncertainty and
ambiguity give them more room to
maneuver in the struggle to reconcile
multiple internal and external expectations and demands.

CONCLUSION
Mission drift can most precisely be
defined as retrospective changes in
stated preferences to fit unplanned
performance outcomes. This is more
likely when an MFI’s goal setting,
performance assessment, and management systems are weak. Evidence
from Imp-Act suggests that many
MFIs do have strong social and
financial performance preferences,
significant room for maneuvering
to manage them, and scope to better
do so. Improved goal setting and
strategic planning, routine monitoring of the poverty status of clients
and ex-clients, a capacity for followup research into the reasons behind
observed changes, and periodic
internal and external reviews of these
activities and systems can all be
carried out more cost-effectively and
systematically. This can help accelerate the pace of innovation and growth
in a more poverty- and gender-aware
manner and help reduce mission drift.
It can also help to moderate some of
the more extravagant claims concerning the potential of microfinance
as a development tool.
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by Isaac H. Smith , Michael A. Broderick, and Richard G. Winso
Poverty is a global phenomenon. According to the
World Trade Organization, the number of people living
on less than US$2 per day has risen by almost 50 percent
since 1980 to almost one half of the world’s population.
In addition, the number of people living in extreme poverty, less than US$1 per day, is also growing in all regions
of the world except China.
In fifty-nine countries, the average income is lower
today than it was twenty years ago. From 1980 to 1996,
only thirty-three of one hundred and thirty developing
countries increased growth by more than 3 percent per
capita, while the gross national product per capita of fiftynine countries declined. Around 1.6 billion people are
economically worse off today than fifteen years ago.
Over the last forty years, the gap between the rich and
the poor has doubled. The richest fifth of the world’s population has 80 percent of the world’s income, while the
poorest fifth have only 1 percent of the world’s income,
according to the World Trade Organization. Many people
see microfinance as a viable and sustainable method to
combat poverty. Microfinance is the extension of small
loans to impoverished individuals, typically women, to
provide them with the capital to start up small businesses
and to lift themselves and their families out of poverty.
The size of microfinance loans tends to be between US$50
and US$100.
DEMAND FOR MICROFINANCE
Seventy-five percent of the world’s 550 million poor families do not have sufficient access to affordable and appropriate financial services. Market demand for microfinance
services is estimated at more than US$300 billion while
market supply is only US$15 billion. For microfinance
to continue growing at average rates of 15 to 30 percent,
US$2.25 to US$5 billion in new portfolio financing

r

and US$300 to US$400 million in new equity will be
required annually. To meet this demand, microfinance
institutions (MFIs) will need to access capital markets to
close the supply-demand gap. MFI leaders and potential
investors need to know about the market mechanisms that
are emerging to help them learn a common language that
will facilitate funding.
INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES
Bridging the gap between MFIs and capital markets are
three main intermediaries: rating institutions, the MIX
Market, and financial intermediaries. Rating institutions
help identify and assess the state of MFI operations. The
MIX Market is a global, Web-based microfinance information platform that links MFIs with investors and donors.
MFI financial intermediaries are specialized private investment funds that specifically target MFIs.
Rating Institutions
One of the greatest challenges MFIs encounter when
seeking access to capital markets is legitimacy and proof
of stability. It is therefore necessary for MFIs to utilize
reliable rating and assessment services like the financial
markets. The Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund
was established in 2001 as a joint initiative of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) and the Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). The primary objectives
of the Rating Fund, as listed on its Web site, are:
• To build markets for MFI rating and assessment
services by encouraging greater demand from MFIs for
professional external evaluations, as well as by strengthening the quality of supply.
• To improve transparency of MFI financial performance as a basis for improved performance and increased
flow of commercial funding.
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Table 1: Approved Rating Agencies[1]
Name of Agency

Primary Product

Regions

Apoyo & Asociados Internacionales
Credit Rating
SAC

Latin America

BRC Investor Services

Credit Rating

Latin America

Class & Asociados S.A.

Credit Rating

Latin America

CRISIL

Credit Rating, Risk Assessment

South Asia

Ecuability

Credit Rating

Latin America

Equilibrium

Credit Rating

Latin America

Feller Rate

Credit Rating

Latin America

Fitch Ratings

Credit Rating

Latin America

Global Credit Rating Co.

Credit Rating

Sub-Saharan Africa

JCR-VIS Credit Rating Company
Limited

Credit Rating

South Asia

M-CRIL

Credit Rating, Risk Assessment

Europe, Asia, and the Pacific

Microfinanza Srl

Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

Microfinanza srl (ES)

Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

Microfinanza Srl (FR)

Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

MicroRate

Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

MicroRate Latin America

Credit Rating, Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

Pacific Credit Rating Holding Inc.

Credit Rating

Latin America

Planet Rating Afrique

Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

Planet Rating Perú SA

Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

Planet Rating SAS

Risk Assessment

Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe,
Asia, and Latin America

Standard & Poor’s

Credit Rating

Latin America

[1] Agencies are approved by the Rating Fund. See http://www.ratingfund.org/rater_compare.aspx for more information.

The fund will finance 80 percent of the cost of a rating/assessment of an MFI by a preapproved institution
(See Table 1).
For an MFI to qualify for rating/assessment funds, it
has to have provided financial services for clients for at
least three years. Hundreds of MFIs have already received
ratings and assessments—lending credence to the notion
of MFIs as an emerging asset class by improving the
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reliability and availability of information on the risk and
performance of MFIs.
The MIX Market
The MIX Market serves as a Web-based link between
MFIs and the public at large. It provides information
on public and private funds that invest in microfinance,
MFI networks, raters and external evaluators, advisory

best practices

firms, and governmental and regulatory agencies. The
goal of the MIX Market, as worded on their Web site, is
“to attract more public and commercially-oriented investors to microfinance by promoting financial transparency,
accountability, and increased disclosure standards.” It
provides MFIs with an opportunity to post a profile on
the Web to market their organization to investors and
donors. Likewise, investors and donors can post profiles
in an effort to develop potential microfinance investment
opportunities. As of July 2007, the MIX Market has profiles of 973 MFIs, 93 investors, and 163 partners.
Financial Intermediaries
MFI financial intermediaries are specialized investment
funds that specifically target MFIs. Private investors are
given the opportunity to invest in a fund, which in turn,
is managed by a third-party organization that invests in
multiple MFIs.
The ACCION Bridge Fund and the Wisconsin
Coordinating Committee for Nicaragua Fund were
pioneering MFI financial intermediaries, providing debt
financing to partner MFIs by selling promissory notes
to the public. Later, in 1995, ProFund was created as a
private equity, venture capital fund that invests in fifteen
Latin American MFIs. In 1999, LA-CIF was created and
is managed by Cyrano Management. Cyrano has since
launched numerous funds that offer different types of
capital to MFIs and different investment risk portfolios
to investors.
Another innovative MFI financial intermediary is
BlueOrchard Finance. It was incorporated as the world’s
first investment company that targeted MFIs exclusively. By soliciting investments from social investors,
BlueOrchard manages millions of dollars, which it is able
to invest in MFIs.
One of the major constraints of an MFI in reaching
the estimated 2 billion people living below the poverty
threshold is the lack of capital. Historically, capital was
only accessed through private or government donations.
In the last decade, MFIs have pushed to limit the dependency on donor capital and to access funding through
the capital markets.
FUNDING VEHICLES
Microfinance Funds
Approximately seventy-five private social investment
funds raise money to distribute to MFIs. Many funds
are affiliated, in varying degrees, with established development organizations—mostly NGOs.

Historically, these funds relied solely on philanthropic
funding. Currently, most funds are not and do not seek to be
self-sustaining. However, a few successful funds are emerging
that offer returns at or near market rates, and another fifteen
to twenty offer modest or below-market returns.
The leading example of a market-sustainable microfinance fund is the Dexia Micro-Credit Fund. Dexia Bank
International of Luxemburg created the fund in 1998;
it was the first commercial investment fund designed to
refinance microfinance institutions. Investors in the fund
range from retail banking customers to institutional investors. The fund is active in twenty developing countries
in Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, and finances forty institutions.
To manage its microfinance portfolio, Dexia Asset
Management relies on the Swiss firm BlueOrchard
Finance. BlueOrchard selects the MFIs through a comprehensive network of contacts. In order for BlueOrchard to
select an MFI, the MFI first must have an independent
external rating. Then BlueOrchard initiates a field visit
and a data collection process for the prospective MFI. On
the basis of BlueOrchard’s on-site evaluation, the financing committee decides to invest or not. If they do invest,
the selected institution reports on a monthly basis over
the whole life of the investment and is visited every year.
Asset-Backed Securities
Another emerging asset class in microfinance is assetbacked securities. A microcredit asset-backed security is a
bond that is collateralized by the future cash flows of principal and interest repayments from an MFI’s clients. The
nature of this financing instrument does require the setting up of a new special purpose company to manage the
loan portfolio that has been set aside to make payments.
One such special purpose company is BlueOrchard
Microfinance Securities (BOMFS) I, formed by
Developing World Markets and BlueOrchard. In what was
the largest transaction in the United States capital markets
to fund microfinance, BOMFS I, in July 2004, issued a
US$40 MM bond to support MFIs in nine developing
countries. In February 2005, BOMFS II raised another
US$47 MM in the capital markets.
JPMorgan helped place BOMFS I securities on Wall
Street. Microfinance debt, as with other new asset classes,
allows Wall Street to profit handsomely from underwriting these new securities and selling them to brokerage
clients. BOMFS I was no exception and paid fees around
3 percent, falling in the middle of the typical span
demanded by investment banks.
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Bond Issues
In 2002, three microfinance institutions in three different countries in Latin America issued bonds in local
capital markets, raising approximately US$25 million in
new debt financing on terms more favorable than those
available from banks. One of these MFIs, Compartamos,
issued a 100 million MXP (approximately US$10 MM),
three-year, 13.1 percent coupon bond. In 2004,
Compartamos tapped the capital markets with a US$44
MM bond rated AA by Fitch and S&P. Both bond placements were issued to individual and institutional investors
and both placements were oversubscribed (i.e., investor
demand exceeded the supply of bonds).
Strategic Partnerships with Commercial Banks
In 2003, CASHPOR, an MFI working in the poorest
region of India, and ICICI Bank, India’s second largest
bank and largest private bank, entered into a mutually
beneficial, strategic partnership agreement to provide
microfinance services to the poor. CASHPOR, with its
market knowledge of poor customers, originates and
services loans, while ICICI, with its strong balance sheet
and vast financial resources, provides capital—including
working capital—for CASHPOR to carry out its work.
Underpinning this agreement is CASHPOR’s approval
of loan proposals. In the first year of joint partnership, CASHPOR recruited six thousand new customers
and distributed US$650,000. The at-risk portfolio (i.e.,
greater than thirty days past due) was 0.02 percent. For
ICICI, this investment has been very advantageous, and
ICICI plans to commit the equivalent of US$1 billion to
this sector over the next five years.

Table 2: S&P 500 Return on Investment[1]
Share Price
Cumulative Return

18%

2000 ROI

-2%

2001 ROI

-17%

2002 ROI

-24%

2003 ROI

32%

2004 ROI

4%

2005 ROI

2%

[1] Statistics found on Yahoo!Finance in April 2006.
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LOOKING FORWARD
“We are changing the perception that microfinance institutions are funded only by charitable donations,” said Drew
Tulchin, manager of GF-USA’s capital market programs.
Currently, only an estimated 20 percent of microfinance
funding is made by commercial operators, according to
GF-USA. “This success expands the equation to include
investors as viable partners through commercial financing.”

For INVESTORS: a UNIQUE COMBINATION
of SOCIAL and FINANCIAL RETURNS

One important distinction between microfinance debt
and other asset classes is that microfinance debt offers
what is called double bottom line returns—which means
that microfinance not only offers an attractive financial
risk-return profile, but it also offers a significant social
return. Microfinance is widely recognized as one of the
most effective poverty reduction tools. In 2005, the
United Nations declared 2005 as the Year of Microcredit.
Social Returns
Microfinance has proven to be a very efficient way to
alleviate poverty. It has stimulated grassroots entrepreneurship, job creation, and community and financial
infrastructure development; it has raised family living
standards and growth of small businesses; and it has
enhanced social and economic development by facilitating
access to capital markets.
Appealing Financial Risk-Return Profile
Wall Street is known to be heartless when it comes to
investment decisions. Investors look for high returns
balanced with potential risk for an investment. In order
to interest investors, microfinance debt must provide an
attractive return based on its risk.
BlueOrchard estimates that microfinance debt offers
a better return than monetary instruments. Specifically, it
estimates microfinance debt to have earned an additional
150 to 200 basis points with only a slightly higher level of
risk and concludes it is an excellent alternative to fiduciary
deposits or certificates of deposits.
The asset-backed security BOMFS I is an example of
a varied risk-return profile in the microfinance investment
class. BOMFS I issued a seven-year deal that has four
layers of various risks or tranches. The senior debt portion
accounts for US$30 MM, or 75 percent, and is guaranteed by Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
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an agency of the U.S. federal government—thus making
this portion a risk-free investment. The return on the
senior tranche is between 0.25 percent and 0.5 percent
higher than similar risk-free treasury securities.
Weak Correlation
Another attractive prospect of microfinance debt is the
low correlation the returns have with other assets. A key
strategy for investors is to try to diversify their investment
portfolios in an effort to reduce their overall risk. As the
world becomes more global, markets become more heavily
correlated—thus making it increasingly difficult for investors to diversify their portfolio risk.
Microfinance weakly correlates with political, economic, or even climatic events. The informal sector is
by its very nature a thriving place of permanent business
creation, which is less directly linked to the fate of the
formal economy. Similarly, it weakly correlates with global
financial movements on the major markets. Table 2 and
Figures 1 and 2 show the returns of Dexia Micro-Credit
Fund and the return on the U.S. market as measured by

the S&P 500. The period in question, September 1998
to June 2005, was a severe recession for the U.S. economy
following the bust of the dot-com bubble. As seen in the
graph the Dexia Micro-Credit Fund performance shows
no correlation with the market, with a cumulative return
for the period of 34.3 percent compared to an 18 percent
return for the S&P 500.
Attractive, Fast-Growing Industry
The microfinance industry is developing fast, both in size
and quality. First and foremost, the size of demand is
growing exponentially, driven by the millions of microentrepreneurs who are still longing for basic financial
services. If they are to meet their projected demand,
microbankers estimate that in the next five years alone,
they will need between US$10 to US$20 billion. Second,
new and increasingly sophisticated products (e.g., credit
and debit cards, leasing, housing and education finance,
and insurance and transfer payments) are being introduced as the industry matures, and the existing clients
need to evolve with the growth of their businesses, which
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pushes still further the funding requirements of this
industry. Competition is currently limited or non-existent
in most markets, particularly in Asia and Africa, creating
a unique short-term growth opportunity for microfinance
service providers to capitalize on the industry’s attractive
returns.
The industry has a documented track record of more
than fifteen years that shows a global asset quality stronger
than other financial asset classes. Over the last five years,
“winners” have emerged from the industry’s fragmented
marketplace, setting standards for best practice.
REASON NOT TO INVEST
With any unique emerging asset class there is always some
uncertainty. Investors and uncertainty do not like each
other, and there exist real questions about the quality and
safety of microfinance investments.
Some of the criticisms of microfinance debt include:
• The majority of microfinance debt is not traded in
a liquid market and is therefore difficult to price.
• There is currently not a large enough amount of
microfinance debt for institutional investors to use as a
key investment to diversify risk.
• The level of formal financial disclosure is not as formalized as other types of investments, which could lead
to exaggerated perception of default risk.
• Investors do not have any expertise with MFIs and
microfinance debt.
The list pinpoints areas of concern mainly from an
institutional investor’s perspective. The positive news is
that there are not underlying weaknesses in the essentials
of the microfinance industry. Rather, most items can be
overcome through better communication of the market’s
fundamentals and through changes in the way the industry presents itself to investors.

For MFIs: BREAKING into the GAME
MFIs traditionally have relied on donors to provide
funding for microcredit. Many are not sure how to access
capital markets themselves and may not even see a reason
to pursue this source of funding.
REASONS TO ACCESS CAPITAL MARKETS
The mere notion of accessing capital markets may be
completely foreign to many MFIs. What is the purpose
of accessing capital markets? MFIs are currently satisfying
only an estimated 10 percent of the demand for micro32
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credit. The full size of the market is roughly US$300 billion, while donors only account for less than US$1 billion
per year. Meeting demand will require an ever-increasing
influx of cash flows. Private investors via capital markets
are the most realistic source for such an immense amount
of needed funds.
A secondary reason for MFIs to work towards accessing
capital markets is that it will inevitably lead to increased
operational efficiency, financial accountability, and transparency. Just to be considered by private investors, an
MFI would need to prove itself as a viable organization
with competent management and sustainable operations.
HOW TO GAIN ACCESS
We offer four key recommendations for MFIs seeking to access capital markets. First—and most difficult—an MFI must become profitable and self-sufficient.
Otherwise, private investors will be reluctant to risk
their capital. Second, get a rating and assessment from
an accredited organization. Third, register on the MIX
Market. Fourth, network.
Become profitable: For many MFIs, the notion of
profitability may be daunting, intimidating, and seemingly
out of reach. To effectively access capital markets, however,
MFIs must become sustainable organizations that investors
can have confidence in. The first step toward profitability
is learning the language of business. MFIs must become
familiar with basic business terminology to level the playing field with investors. The second step is to incorporate
basic business practices (e.g., financial management) into
standard operations. A simple Internet search can provide countless sources of information to help MFIs better

best practices

manage their organization and work toward profitability.
For example, at http://www.managementhelp.org/finance/
fp_fnce/fp_fnce.htm, a Web site titled “Basic Guide to
Financial Management In For-Profits,” advice is given on
basic bookkeeping, budget management, financial statement development, and much more.
There is a risk to focusing on profitability: a theory
called mission drift. As the theory goes, as soon as a nonprofit organization begins to focus on sustainability and
profitability, they begin to lose sight of the very mission
and purpose for which they came into existence. It must
be understood, however, that if the long-term goal of
microfinance is to help alleviate poverty by providing the
poor with access to capital, then billions more dollars
need to be raised to meet the massive demand. Becoming
profitable and more business-like in order to access capital
markets is one of the most promising options for the MFI
community to meet its ultimate goal of offering capital
to all who need it. MFIs may therefore look at accessing
capital markets as central to their mission, not as a detractor from it.

.mixmarket.org. According to the Web site, “The MIX
Market strives to facilitate exchange and investments flows,
promote transparency, and improve reporting standards in
the microfinance industry.” By registering, MFIs expose
their organization to potential donors and investors.
Network: Although obvious, it should not be underemphasized that one of the best ways to accomplish a goal is
to learn from someone who has already accomplished that
goal. Numerous MFIs have successfully accessed capital markets. Networking with these organizations is an
important opportunity to learn from past failures and successes. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP)
regularly posts the Microfinance Capital Markets Update
on its Web site. The report lists the recent debt and equity
deals between MFIs and investors. Networking with
organizations currently in the process of accessing capital
markets can also provide MFIs with valuable information.

CONCLUSION
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From NGO to MFI:
A Guidebook for Successful Transformation

G

iven increased public awareness and interest in
microfinance, the need to offer well-designed
financial products through sound microfinance
institutions (MFIs) has never been more acute whether
through up scaling by nongovernmental organizations
or through downscaling by commercial banks. Both
approaches offer benefits in the effort to extend the
reach of microfinance services, but NGOs that seek to
offer new financial products will have to revolutionize
their internal structure to manage this process. This
transformation, unfortunately, is daunting. It most often
involves a complete overhaul of the NGO and mandates
a rare combination of skills, money, time, and patience.
However, NGOs that can effectively transform themselves into MFIs are rewarded with a stronger community presence, an opportunity to expand the range
of financial services, and an ultimately deeper local
financial penetration.
Joanna Ledgerwood and Victoria White’s Transforming
Microfinance Institutions: Providing Full Financial Services
to the Poor offers a revealing and valuable “field manual”
on how to initiate this transformation and deal with
the challenges associated with each aspect of the change.
The authors draw from their own impressive experiences
and those of other industry experts to help NGOs map
their strategies to become formal, licensed, deposit-taking financial institutions; to comprehensively address the
institutional change needed to implement the right busi-
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ness strategy, and to successfully position themselves in
the financial sector. The book addresses a multitude of
challenges faced by NGOs undergoing this transformation, ranging from building a human resources strategy
(to ably cope with the need for new skills) to ensuring
a meaningful governance framework (to build investor
confidence and transparency). The authors have supplemented their discussion with detailed checklists that
provide NGOs with immediate tools to design their own
strategy. They have achieved a fine balance of offering
outlines that will be relevant to all NGOs without being
overly prescriptive and rigid. This aspect alone sets this
book apart and enhances its overall contribution to the
field of microfinance development.
In keeping with a practical, no-nonsense approach, the
book is organized into fifteen chapters, and each delves
deeper into one particular aspect of the transformation. Two meticulously detailed case studies on Uganda’s
experience follow—one explaining a tiered approach to
regulating microfinance institutions and the other describing the creation of Uganda Microfinance Limited (UML).
Even though the authors rely heavily on their experiences in Africa, each chapter provides examples of NGO
transformation in other regions, such as Peru (MiBanco),
Mongolia (XAC Bank), and Bolivia (PRODEM).
Moreover, examples of financial budgets, marketing
plans, legal due diligence checklists, terms of references
for new positions, and other handy tools are generously

interspersed throughout the book for any NGO considering transformation. The authors also helpfully capture
the time needed to accomplish each step. Fittingly, each
chapter can stand alone, allowing readers to turn directly
to the chapters of interest.
The authors point out that NGO transformation
offers the advantage of deposit-taking services to its
clients that diversify financial services and provide a
source of capital for the institution. Whether or not
this evolution is driven by the need to provide better
access to financial services or to have a deeper impact on
local economic development, the actual transformation
introduces new fiduciary responsibilities for the new
MFI that require legal, financial, and human resources
processes to manage.
Without question, introducing deposit-taking services
will fundamentally change the nature of the institution—
the MFI needs to extensively prepare. Understanding
the client market, designing the right type of voluntary
savings product, and analyzing the results of pilot testing
of the new savings products will help fine-tune these services—which can be the first step toward financial deepening for both the MFI and the clients. MFIs must improve
their internal controls, antifraud measures, and overall
risk management to protect people’s savings. Ledgerwood
and White repeatedly (and accurately) emphasize that a
commensurate investment in time and money is mandatory for success. The NGO will have to make strategic
decisions on the relations it will have with the new MFI,
the new governance structure, recruiting, and strengthening human resources.
In addition to the necessary institutional changes,
an MFI needs to understand the regulatory environment in which this transformation is taking place. A
country’s financial regulatory framework for banks will
ultimately influence how quickly an NGO can convert
into an MFI. The book includes a primer on regulation and supervision of the microfinance sector, which
succinctly frames risk management issues for the MFI
and previews the range of prudential and nonprudential
reporting requirements.
The funding structure will determine, in effect, the sustainability of an MFI. Though initial donor capital may
launch this operation, the MFI needs to identify a longterm mix of debt and equity financing that aligns with its
risk return appetite and considers tax and other financial

regulations. The key is to find the right mix of investors
that share the MFI’s vision and has a double bottom line
that stays within the minimum capital to risk weighted
assets. If managed well, MFIs can tap markets through
bond issuances, local currency borrowing, or public
offering to generate capital.
When the authors turn to their case studies, the book
weakens. The Ugandan example highlights how a supportive government and a vibrant donor community can
serve as a catalyst to microfinance, but, while interesting,
the Uganda experience is not necessarily a fair representative of reality elsewhere. NGO leaders contemplating the
transformation into a full-fledged MFI need to understand how other institutional environments may be more
challenging. The authors should have offered more
in-depth case studies on other NGO transformation
experiences—both positive and negative. By the book’s
own admission, such examples abound.
But such criticism is minor when compared against the
book in its entirety. Ledgerwood and White should be
commended for tackling such a complicated and pertinent
topic, which is a welcome and timely contribution to
the field of microfinance, particularly given the increased
attention to the industry. This detailed book on how to
transform NGOs into successful, soundly regulated, and
licensed MFIs is nothing short of required reading for
donors, regulators, academics, and anyone interested in
supporting this process.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Geetha Rao Ramani is currently an economist
working on economic development policy at the U.S.
Treasury. Previously, she spent time in Indonesia, India,
and Haiti analyzing microfinance services. Ramani holds
a master’s degree in international economics from the
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns
Hopkins University.
About the Book
Ledgerwood and White’s Transforming Microfinance
Institutions: Providing Full Financial Services to the Poor
was published by World Bank Publications in August 2006.
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The Academy for Creating Enterprise

36

ESR — FALL 2007

photo: the academy for creating enterprise

The Academy for Creating Enterprise
(ACE) is a nonprofit school in the
Philippines established by Stephen W.
and Bette Gibson in 1999. ACE has
provided more than 1,100 students
with hope, motivation, education,
and knowledge needed to plan, start,
and build microenterprise businesses.
Graduates from ACE apply these
skills, which enables a higher level
of self-reliance and a better
lifestyle for their families.
According to Stephen Gibson,
Filipinos were ideal candidates for
the academy. “They are literate, generally fluent in English, and have few
opportunities in their own country
to get good jobs, no matter how
well-educated they are.” ACE focuses
its resources on providing microenACE entrepreneur’s microenterprise in the Philippines
terprise training to those who have
demonstrated self-discipline and the
83 percent, are involved in an incomeresults in more financial success. The
ability to study and work hard.
generating activity. Hundreds of the
poor already instinctively know how
Initially, the academy taught
graduates are teaching these principles
to survive; however, they generally
students business rules during the
to others in their communities. The
don’t know how to thrive sufficiently
eight-week course at the residentialgraduates say they are motivated to
to get out of poverty,” says Gibson.
entrepreneur training center, hoping
teach others how to become more
To teach business principles and
they would be able to apply the prinself-reliant because they understand
encourage behavioral change, the
ciples correctly once they returned to
how the principles they have learned
Gibson’s developed, taught, and
their hometowns.
can change lives.
published curriculum titled Where
While this worked, an improved
There Are No Jobs. The curriculum
Gibson envisions that many ACE
model still teaches the rules of thumb is based on a set of principles for
graduates will start their own franbut also takes into consideration culchises and employ thousands of other
microenterprise success. The curricutural issues that have helped students
lum teaches these business concepts
academy graduates as their franchisees.
struggling to stick with the habits of
through case studies, role plays,
This dream is beginning to be fulfilled
successful entrepreneurs once they
discussions, and internships to give
through ACE franchises such as
returned home and started working
students an understanding of how
Cellular City shops, cartridge-refilling
in their businesses. Simply knowing
and why they should apply these
businesses, Bette’s Bakeshops, Mabuhay
what they should do to propel themvital principles in their businesses.
Pharmacies, and Island Properties.  
selves out of poverty was not enough.  
The truth of those principles—
“The graduates are torn between
Partners in Action
and the power they have to change
the traditions of their culture or
Brigham Young University has
lives—is illustrated by the fact that
adopting a culture of behavior that
worked closely with Stephen W.
over 1,100 academy alumni, about

Gibson and the Academy for
Creating Enterprise since its inception in 1999. Gibson has been one
of the main proponents in helping
the Economic Self-Reliance Center
begin and implement much of their
work in microfranchising. Gibson
has also collaborated with the ESR

Center to promote and sell the Where
There Are No Jobs business curriculum.
Many BYU students contributed in
producing two of the four workbooks.
Recently, Gibson, co-authored
the book Microfranchising: Creating
Wealth at the Bottom of the Pyramid.
This edited book is the first of its

kind addressing the new microfranchising concept. It was developed
through the sponsorship of the
Academy for Creating Enterprise
and the ESR Center.
Visit www.the-academy.org for
more information.

to offer many additional services that
benefit all members of the bank and
the community, including infrastructure, housing, sanitation, drinking
water, education, and family-planning projects. Grameen requires the
applicant to adhere to “16 decisions”
before giving a loan to ensure that
the applicant is committed to these
greater social purposes. These decisions outline the basics of a quality
lifestyle and include such things as
health and sanitation advisories, education and environmental policies, and
community-involvement strategies.  
Overall, the entire Grameen model
has served as an example to improve
the quality of family life around the
world. Grameen has instituted a

unique poverty-fighting system that
has raised women’s social status and
brought millions out of poverty and
into a new way of life that is empowering and changing the way people
live. In recognition of their innovation and effort, Muhammad Yunus
and the Grameen Bank won the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.

Grameen Bank
The “Grameen” Bank in the Bangla
language means the village or rural
bank. In 1976 Muhammad Yunus
started an informal action-research
project that gave women in poverty
more affordable access to capital,
and in 1983 the Grameen Bank was
officially organized. The more formalized and institutional banks would
not even consider loaning money to
the poor, but Yunus and the Grameen
Bank devised a plan that would allow
them to not only loan money to the
poor but to also bring thousands out
of poverty.
Yunus began his action-research
project with forty-two women in
poverty and a total loan portfolio
of US$27. Now Grameen Bank has
grown to over 7.2 million borrowers
and a total outstanding loan portfolio
of US$489 million. The bank offers
small loans to women in groups of
five; this allows women to accept a
loan without collateral by encouraging and ensuring each other’s loans
are paid. It also allows the loan
clients to own 94 percent of the
bank, while the government owns the
remaining 6 percent. With such high
investment interest, the repayment
rate is an outstanding 98 percent.
In addition to making weekly loan
payments, Grameen also encourages
their clients to save a portion of
their income. With this disciplined
repayment scheme, Grameen is able

Partners in Action
Muhammad Yunus first met students
from BYU at a poverty conference at
the University of Michigan in 1998.
He was truly amazed at the growing number of students who were
acting as microcredit change agents
at BYU. Yunus has since served as an
instigator for BYU by forming the

Grameen Programs
•	Grameen Phone: Employs “phone ladies” to serve as a village pay
phone, providing phone service for the village for a small fee
•	Grameen Telecom: Extends cell- and telecommunications to
rural villagers
• Grameen Fund: Provides capital for viable business ventures
• Grameen Technology: Develops IT products for rural poor
•	Grameen Energy: Creates alternative energy solutions such
as solar and wind energy
• Grameen Education: Promotes mass education in rural areas
• Grameen Knitwear: Exports knit clothes around the world
• Grameen Cybernet: Provides Internet services
•	Grameen Trust: Promotes dialogue, workshops, and training
about microcredit

37

Marriott School of Business Faculty
Committee to Alleviate Family
Poverty, which was a predecessor to
the BYU Economic Self-Reliance
Center. Yunus also became a key supporter and one of the founding editors
for the Journal of Microfinance published by Brigham Young University
(now called the ESR Review).
Additionally, Yunus has spoken at
many of the BYU microcredit conferences and was highlighted in the BYU
premier microcredit documentary
Small Fortunes in 2005 that has helped
promote microcredit around the world.
Researchers and students from
BYU have had special chances to

interact with the Grameen Bank
and Muhammad Yunus. Yunus
helped foster a dozen honors and
masters theses by students. Also, he
encouraged the faculty to overcome
doubts and resistance to the idea of
microfinance as an academic field;
they have since published reputable
books, articles, and conference
papers about microfinance.
In 1998, BYU students excited
about microcredit formed the Grameen
Support Group. The expressed goal of
the club was to educate students on
campus about the important role of
microcredit in alleviating poverty. The
club sparked the creation of other cam-

pus clubs such as the Ouelessebougou
Club, the Africa Club, the Microcredit
Club, the FINCA International Club,
and the Economic Self-Reliance
Student Association.
Dozens of BYU students have had
the privilege to work with Grameen
as support staff, translators, editors, and field researchers. These
important student impacts have
helped make BYU the leading microcredit advocate among universities
worldwide. These great experiences
and impacts all grew out of the
initial pioneering efforts to partner
with this great individual and profound organization.

photo: ascend alliance

ascend Alliance
This year ASCEND Alliance is celebrating twenty-five
years of service to communities around the world.
ASCEND’s mission is “empowering those in need to save
their children and ascend out of poverty.” They engage in
active partnerships, create economies of scale, focus on
accountability, and promote true sustainability.
One of the most effective and critical partners in this
process is local, state, and federal governments. ASCEND
has developed a “successful strategy of ongoing, handson partnerships with in-country governments and other
like-minded NGOs.” It has “negotiated ground-breaking
matching fund agreements (where governments match
the money put into the majority of the projects), which
enables a new level of teamwork with governments and
other partners,” says President Carolyn Dailey.
ASCEND sees partnering as the key to success in the
communities they serve. They consider all projects and
programs as “theirs”—the community’s. They expect the
community to organize themselves and the programs,
to contribute, and to work hard at making them succeed. ASCEND programs start at the grass-roots level
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School construction project in Peru completed with local and
foreign volunteers.

with community counsels who work with local, permanent staff. ASCEND uses a process called Asset Based
Community Development (ABCD) to help the community make decisions about programs and projects. This
process requires staff members to ask the community
what assets they have; then, as a group, they discover the
resources they have to offer. Finally, they talk about their
goals as a community and think of ways that their assets
can help achieve their goals. ASCEND staff joins them
for the final step of the process to discuss the gaps that
need to be filled in.

partner profiles

Though intensive collaborating is challenging, this
and technologies and informs ASCEND when communipartner approach has proved very successful. If a comties are achieving sustainability.
munity has come to a consensus about a project, donated
According to ASCEND, true sustainability occurs as
all of the labor, pooled their resources to supply money
a community graduates to self-sufficiency. ASCEND
and materials, and have support from the government,
programs and partnerships have a phased-in, self-funding
suddenly it is the people’s project and success is much
plan so that development activities, communities, and
in-country operations can become self-sufficient by
more likely.
using local resources instead of continually depending
In addition to great partnerships, ASCEND employs
on headquarters.
a state-of-the-art methodology called RAMP—Rapid
Action Mentoring Program. RAMP is a capacity-building
Partners in Action
program, centered in life-skills mentoring (functional literacy) for community, family, and individual development. Aaron Mckay was an MBA student looking for an additional business experience prior to an internship with
Solution areas include education, enterprise, health, and
simple technology. RAMP helps introduce these teachings American Express. His emphasis was finance, but he
was longing for an entrepreneurial experience. Working with the
ESR
Center, he found ASCEND
ASCEND Alliance Programs (not a complete listing)
Alliance. The opportunity it provided fit perfectly with his schedule
• Comprehensive Expeditions: Participants train community
and offered many career-building
workers and “get down in the trenches” to help poor communiexperiences.
ties build schools, libraries, health posts, water systems, gardens,
McKay traveled to Beira,
greenhouses, stoves, bathrooms, or latrines.
Mozambique, as a social venture
• Youth Empowerment Programs: High school and college
consultant. His Portuguese backstudents are trained as youth team leaders on comprehensive
ground served him well as he worked
expeditions.
with the sole in-country employee.
• Medical Missions: Medical teams work to serve the
“She was the cultural expert,” Mckay
needs of people without resources to help initiate and
said. “I was the business expert.”
They
worked together daily to create
sustain change. They train community members on preventive
materials for hand-made pumps, find
measures and simple remedies, limited treatment of medical
customers, and sell the idea to the
and surgical problems, and SOAR (Sustainable Orphan Advocacy
local government.
and Rescue).
An entrepreneurial experience in
• Business Training Teams: Business teams train the poor on
every way, Mckay had just one week
basic knowledge and principles necessary to operate a successof training prior to his departure. He
ful small business, create self-employment opportunities, and
maintained contact with ASCEND
make family business more profitable.
headquarters and the ESR Center
• Education: ASCEND utilizes a broad range of simple lifewhile in Mozambique, receiving
skills manuals. Education initiatives also include teacher training,
adequate support to fulfill his task.
library books, school supplies, and educational scholarships.
Mckay learned that working with
• Technology & Construction: ASCEND has significant expertise
NGOs was not to be a one-time
in developing innovative, simple technologies that can change
experience: “Now I have a greater
people’s lives. They give hands-on training to community memdesire to arrange my future and my
career so that I can participate in
bers, allowing for replication, maintenance, and sustainability.
more
international NGO projects
Initiatives include projects such as greenhouses, drip-irrigation
in the future.”
systems, and food-storage facilities.
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Motu Biofuels with their sponsor, Mark Palmer, Dean Ned Hill of the
Marriott School of Management, and Todd Manwaring

ideas can be stifled by internships, first jobs, and other
events that students must attend to, which often puts
the business plan on hold or results in a complete halt,”
Manwaring explains.
Also unique to SIVC is the format of award allocation.
The center provides an initial award to the three winning plans, which can go toward the venture or be split
among the team members. The remaining award money
(approximately 75 percent) is disbursed to the ventures
only as they meet specific implementation milestones set
by the judges and advisors.
Although teams are motivated by the monetary awards,
they gain much more in the experience. David Stoker, a
Motu Biofuels team member, states the most valuable
aspect of the competition was what he learned while
designing the business plan: “It was working as a team,
combining expertise, making concessions, giving and taking, and being a good team member.”
Additionally, students gain invaluable skills and confidence. “There is something inspiring in simply turning
your ideas and dreams into a reality,” said Stoker. “This
experience will give me greater confidence to chase my
dreams, to take risks, and to not be afraid of the work
required to launch something, both in business and in
other aspects of my life.”

photo: richard mcclendon

otu Biofuels, a team of engineering and
public health students, beat out twenty-one
other teams in this year’s Social Innovation
and Venture Competition (SIVC) at Brigham Young
University. Motu Biofuels created a way to process coconuts in Tonga into biodiesel. The competition’s goal is to
focus the energy and ideas of students into sustainable
social ventures that improve the world’s welfare.
For the fourth consecutive year, the Economic
Self-Reliance Center hosted SIVC. This year, the center
placed an emphasis on engendering multidisciplinary,
university-wide involvement. Students were invited to
submit business plans that deal with poverty, education,
environment, healthcare, etc. Motu Biofuels represents
the multidisciplinary teamwork that the center hopes for
in this competition. “We love to see students from every
discipline and from other campuses working together
with faculty and practitioners to submit viable ventures
that create social value, return, or impact,” says Todd
Manwaring, managing director of the ESR Center. The
second place winner, TRIP, created an international
youth rehabilitation program, and the third place winner,
PASHiON, created a clothing manufacturing business
in Palestine.
Unlike many other social innovation competitions,
SIVC also encourages students to partner with existing
practitioners to build off their experience. “Our hope is
that students will partner with practitioners to plan and
deliver the innovation. We know that often these exciting
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Help the world’s poor to become more economically self-
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reliant by using these handbooks to teach basic microenterprise
principles. The Where There Are No Jobs handbooks are being
used in more than a dozen countries, and have helped nearly
1,000 international students experience business success.

VOLUME 1

25 Rules of Thumb for Microenterprise Success
VOLUME 2

We began using the Spanish version of Where There
Are No Jobs in 2005. Some of our 75 small business
owners have already doubled or tripled their businesses.

— JHON ACUÑA

{

Microenterprise Training Coordinator
Ascend Humanitarian Alliance
Santa Cruz, Bolivia

26 Basic Microenterprise Lessons
VOLUME 3

18 Microenterprise Case Studies
VOLUME 4

39 Summaries and 9 Case Studies of Microfranchise Opportunities
Published by The Academy for Creating Enterprise
To order these handbooks, please visit
selfreliance.byu.edu/shop
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ASCEND Alliance helps communities
gain skills to ascend out of poverty.
Read more on p. 38.

